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Abstract
We reply to the Comment made in arXiv:1107.4435v1 [quant-ph] (Phys.
Lett. A 374 (2010) 1097) by noting some erroneous considerations therein
resulting in a misleading view of the quantum key distribution protocol
in question. We then correct the rates provided for the Intercept–and-
Resend attack and we complete the analysis of Eve’s attack based on a
double CNOT gate.
In the Comment reported in [1], the security analysis of the quantum key
distribution protocol (QKD) introduced in [2] and named ”6DP” was reviewed
and partially criticized. The main point raised by the Comment is that in the
analysis of selected attacks in [2], 6DP’s Control Mode uses two qubits from
the same basis in contradiction with 6DP’s Encoding Mode where two qubits
from different bases were selected for a reliable decoding process. The Comment
proceeded with calculations and figures based on the notion that Alice chooses
the same bases as that of Bob’s preparation for both the qubits in a pair in a
control mode.
As we showed in [2] and will further clarify here, it is neither necessary nor
efficient to follow such a prescription in the 6DP and analysis of half the qubit
pair is sufficient.
In Ref. [1] two main attacks from the eavesdropper Eve are analyzed, the
intercept-resend attack (IRA) and the double-CNOT attack (2CNOTA). In the
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following, we report the security analysis for these two attacks thus demonstrat-
ing our claims. Moreover we correct a crucial feature of the 2CNOTA which
was not captured in [1].
We begin with a brief description of 6DP; a two-way QKD protocol based
on nonentangled qubits generalizing to the use of 3 mutually unbiased bases
(MUB). In 6DP, two qubits are prepared by Bob in two different bases chosen
randomly from 3 MUB and sent to and fro to Alice who will encode by executing
1 of 4 unitaries (3 Pauli spin matrices as well as the identity) on each qubit.
Bob’s sharp measurement of the received qubits would allow him to decode
Alice’s encoding. Security is achieved by having a control mode where randomly,
Alice would with a certain probability make measurements in bases of her choice
and through public discussions determine if an eavesdropper was in fact present.
Arguably the most straightforward eavesdropping strategy against 6DP is
the IRA which foresees Eve making measurements of the traveling qubits in the
bases of her choice on both the forward and backward path to glean a maximal
amount of information of Alice’s encoding.
The IRA was studied in [2] with the main purpose of showing that among all
possible Eve’s choices of measuring bases, the one including the same bases used
by Bob, i.e. the canonical X , Y and Z, is the one which minimizes the detection
probability. The analysis of Control Mode contained in [2] was limited to only
one qubit at a time in the pair of qubits prepared by Bob. However this does
not imply that Eve should necessarily attack one qubit only, nor does it imply
that she should attack both qubits in the same basis (this was the allegation
made in [1] regarding the analysis in [2]).
As we described above, the 6DP Encoding Mode is performed by using two
different bases. It is then quite obvious that Eve should attack the protocol
using two different bases, lest her information gain would not be maximized.
In [2] we showed that the minimum probability for Eve to evade detection per
single qubit analyzed by Alice and Bob is 0.5. Thus the legitimate parties could
have inferred the presence of an eavesdropper in either half of the pair as long
as their measurement basis coincides; which is certainly more probable than
having both qubits measured in coinciding bases.
The Comment [1] further reported the probability to evade detection for Eve
attacking twice in the same basis as 0.28, claimed for the sake of comparison
to what the author had alleged of [2]. We stress that this had never been the
case in [2] as such an attack has no relevance to the protocol where Eve would
gain less information in doing so. To assume that Eve performs an attack which
cannot provide her with maximal information is quite arguable and contrary to
the principles usually followed in analyzing a quantum key distribution problem.
Finally, it is also suggested in Ref. [1] that Eve needs to measure the traveling
qubits in the same basis as Bob’s in order to gain from them the full amount of
information encoded by Alice. This is hardly true. In fact, the measurements
performed by Eve during the IRA effectively project the traveling qubits into
2
her measurement bases, which then are subjected to Alice’s encoding. As noted
in [2] (see Fig.1 and following discussion), Eve’s best choice for the bases is
any element of the set {XY,XZ, Y Z, Y X,ZX,ZY }, composed by all possible
different bases combination, irrespective of Bob’s choice. In this way, Eve is
using exactly one of the same possible states as that of Bob, thus committing
to a faithful decoding of Alice’s unitaries and complete information thereof.
Let us now review the analysis of 2CNOTA reported in [1]. For that, it is use-
ful to write the states prepared by Bob, |0〉 , |1〉 , |x+〉 , |x−〉 , |y+〉 , |y−〉, as a sin-
gle state a |0〉+ b |1〉 with coefficients (a, b) given by (1, 0), (0, 1), (1/√2, 1/√2),
(1/
√
2,−1/√2), (1/√2, i/√2) and (1/√2,−i/√2) respectively. The global evo-
lution Bob’s state and Eve’s ancilla (those with subscript E) under the 2CNOTA
is as follows:
Iz± (a |0〉+ b |1〉) |0〉E → (a |0〉 − b |1〉) |0〉E ,
Yz± (a |0〉+ b |1〉) |0〉E → (b |1〉 − a |0〉) |1〉E ,
where Iz+ ≡ Ĉ (I ⊗ I) Ĉ, Iz− ≡ Ĉ (Z ⊗ I) Ĉ, Yz+ ≡ Ĉ (iY ⊗ I) Ĉ and Yz− ≡
Ĉ (X ⊗ I) Ĉ and Ĉ ≡ CNOT , with Eve’s ancilla the target qubit and Bob’s
state the control qubit [3]. By a single execution of this attack Eve only can
distinguish between the sets
S11 ≡ {I, Z} , S12 ≡ {iY,X} ,
but cannot distinguish between the two elements in each set. This means that by
a single execution of the 2CNOTA, Eve cannot access the full 2-bit information
encoded by Alice on each pair of qubits prepared by Bob. This fact was correctly
noted in [1]. What was not noted is that by simply executing another 2CNOTA
(on the other half of the qubit pair), Eve can easily access the full information.
In fact, in the second 2CNOTA, Eve can use an ancilla in the state |x+〉E rather
than |0〉E and have her qubit in the position of the control and Bob’s as the
target [3].
With this choice, straightforward calculations (not presented here) reveals
that the second 2CNOT allows Eve to distinguish between the sets
S21 ≡ {I,X} , S22 ≡ {iY, Z} ,
but not between the two elements in each set, in full analogy with what happens
in the first 2CNOTA (it is just a change of basis). Hence, by comparing the
results obtained in the two executions of the 2CNOTA, Eve can learn which
operation was performed by Alice. For example, if Eve obtains S12 in the first
2CNOTA and S21 in the second 2CNOTA, then she will know that Alice encoded
the operation X .
Quickly summarizing all of the above, security analysis in 6DP’s Control
Mode does not compel Eve to measure twice in the same basis while in the
Encoding Mode, she is not obliged to measure in the same bases as Bob in
order to steal full information from Alice through the IRA. Finally, although
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a single execution of the 2CNOTA, as it was originally proposed in [2], cannot
supply Eve with the full amount of information, a straightforward generalization
including two executions of the 2CNOTA can, thus restituting importance to
our original analysis about this attack. In conclusion, we have shown that the
analysis contained in Ref. [1] contains a number of inaccuracies and in our
present Reply we have corrected them, thus re-establishing the soundness of
our original results.
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